The Minsk Game

Jesse Driscoll () and Dominique Arel ()
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Jesse Driscoll: University of California San Diego
Dominique Arel: Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Ottawa

Public Choice, 2025, vol. 205, issue 3, No 3, 363-386

Abstract: Abstract Why did the Minsk Accords fail to prevent the current Ukraine War? Standard explanations for the diplomatic failure center on irreconcilable commitment problems between Moscow and Washington: both revisionist with respect to the other, neither able to credibly promise non-involvement in the other’s perceived sphere of influence, and both capable of recruiting local allies within Ukraine. This account omits relevant historical context related to the demographic legacy of the Soviet Union. To shed light on the kinds of policies that would be most effective at “buying peace” in some dimly-visible future, we analyze a simple model of domestic Ukrainian interest group politics.

Keywords: Collective action; Bargaining; Preference falsification; Nationalism; Ukraine (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-025-01259-4

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