Institutionally constrained drone adoption

Garrett R. Wood ()
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Garrett R. Wood: Virginia Wesleyan University, Department of Management, Business, and Economics

Public Choice, 2025, vol. 205, issue 3, No 7, 469-489

Abstract: Abstract The Russian-Ukrainian war has demonstrated the growing importance of drone warfare, but Ukraine has developed a larger drone fleet and encouraged more production of, and innovation with, these weapons than Russia has. This is surprising given Russia’s larger military budget and greater experience using drones in other conflicts. One of the most important aspects of drone warfare being revealed by this conflict is the advantage conferred by using large quantities of cheap and replaceable drones, an advantage Russia has so far refused to pursue. A theory of institutionally constrained technology adoption is used to argue that Russia cannot fully embrace drone warfare the way that Ukraine has because this could exacerbate internal political insecurity in Russia.

Keywords: Drones; Institutions; National defense; D74; D82; D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-025-01262-9

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