Bespoke science: the use of ad hoc scientific advisory committees in the Covid-19 pandemic

Roger Koppl (), Kira Pronin (), Nick Cowen (), Marta Podemska-Mikluch () and Pablo Paniagua ()
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Roger Koppl: Syracuse University
Kira Pronin: Syracuse University
Nick Cowen: University of Lincoln
Marta Podemska-Mikluch: Gustavus Adolphus College
Pablo Paniagua: Universidad del Desarrollo

Public Choice, 2025, vol. 205, issue 3, No 9, 513-536

Abstract: Abstract Many governments formed ad hoc scientific advisory committees in the Covid-19 pandemic because they offered the government greater control over policy advice than standing agencies. The difference between ad hoc and standing advisory bodies has been little noted in the literature. High-uncertainty crises demanding expertise and requiring action from the national government increase the value of policy discretion, raising the value of controlling the scientific narrative. An ad hoc body is generally easier to control than a standing body because policymakers have greater liberty to choose its members, specify its mandate, and disband and reconstitute it when needed. Control generally requires either a narrow membership or a narrow mandate. If members cannot be chosen to be reliably aligned with the government or its policy preferences, a narrow mandate will restrain the committee from offering undesired advice or analysis. Our argument builds on the public choice assumption of motivational symmetry: The choices of scientists and politicians are shaped by the same motives and desires that influence individuals in any other sphere of life. Our case studies of Italy, UK, US, Poland, Uganda, and Sweden support our theory.

Keywords: Public health; Policy discretion; Policy legitimacy; Experts; Expertise; Scientific advice; Scientific advisory bodies; Scientific advisory committees; Scientific advisory boards; Covid-19; Pandemic; Public choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-025-01299-w

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