The dynamics of political polarization and voting on economic issues: evidence from the Polish parliament, 2005–23

Jacek Lewkowicz (), Michał Sękowski () and Jan Fałkowski ()
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Jacek Lewkowicz: University of Warsaw
Michał Sękowski: University of Warsaw
Jan Fałkowski: University of Warsaw

Public Choice, 2025, vol. 205, issue 3, No 12, 589-611

Abstract: Abstract There have been growing concerns that political polarization is intensifying. These concerns, however, are primarily based on anecdotal evidence, aggregate measures related to political competition, or survey data that aim at eliciting public opinion. We adopt a different approach and look at polarization among the political elite. We examine the degree of consensus in parliamentary voting in the Polish parliament between 2005 and 2023. We find that political polarization was on the rise and that reaching agreement between the parties was more difficult when the votes concerned economic issues. Our results also demonstrate that voting in Parliament essentially became one-dimensional in that it was mainly driven by the government-opposition divide. We also document that voting against the party line was extremely rare, whether the MPs were in the government or an opposition party. This suggests that party discipline may be an important driver of political polarization.

Keywords: Political polarization; Voting behavior; Political competition; Institutional economics; Public choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C54 D72 E60 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-025-01307-z

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