Public choice and national defense: lessons for the Russian–Ukrainian war

Nathan P. Goodman, Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili, Ilia Murtazashvili () and Ali Palida
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Nathan P. Goodman: George Mason University
Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili: University of Pittsburgh
Ilia Murtazashvili: University of Pittsburgh
Ali Palida: University of Pittsburgh

Public Choice, 2025, vol. 205, issue 3, No 5, 419-441

Abstract: Abstract This paper applies public choice theories of national defense to analyze key features of the Russian–Ukrainian war. A key aspect of Ukraine’s political reforms since 2014 has been strengthening the autonomy of local governments. Reforms to Ukraine’s defense system included both aspects of centralization—through the rapid assimilation of private defense organizations in 2014–15 and again in 2021–22—and decentralization, particularly through the creation of local military administrations after Russia’s full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022. The autonomy-enhancing local governance initiatives likely improved Ukraine’s crisis response capacity, while decentralizing aspects of the defense system appear to have bolstered territorial resilience. At the same time, decentralizing defense creates pressure on the autonomy of local governments and the centralizing aspects of defense sector reform raise concerns about declining individual rights and liberties. More broadly, the Russian–Ukrainian war illustrates how public choice theory can illuminate the complex institutional arrangements—both centralized and decentralized—that underpin the coproduction of national defense as a multifaceted public good.

Keywords: Defense economics; Polycentricity; Decentralization; Ukraine; Russian–Ukrainian war (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B52 F52 H11 H12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-025-01322-0

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