The Creeping Competence of the European Central Bank During the Euro Crisis
Prof. Michele Chang ()
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Prof. Michele Chang: Department of European Political and Governance Studies, College of Europe, 11 Dijver, B-8000 Brugge
Credit and Capital Markets, 2018, vol. 51, issue 1, 41-53
The European Central Bank enjoys a large degree of independence due to the academic and policy consensus that independent central banks achieve better results in the pursuit of price stability. Since the global financial crisis, however, ECB activities now includes broader objectives with redistributive consequences. How can we explain this mission creep? This article considers the expansion of the ECB’s role in euro area governance over the last decade. Using a neofunctionalist framework, it shows the weakness of the traditional argument of the ECB as a technocratic actor and demonstrates how the ECB became one of the most influential institutions in the EU beyond monetary policymaking.
JEL-codes: F5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kuk:journl:v:51:y:2018:i:1:p:41-53
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