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The Independence of the European Central Bank

Ulrike Neyer ()
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Ulrike Neyer: Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Universitätsstraße 1, 40225 Düsseldorf

Credit and Capital Markets, 2019, vol. 52, issue 1, 35–68

Abstract: The ECB is formally independent of instructions from any government. During and after the financial crisis and the acute sovereign debt crisis in the euro area, the ECB has used new instruments and has taken on new tasks and responsibilities. This has led to discussions about the independence of the ECB. Against this background, this paper discusses two questions. First, do the new instruments and tasks imply that the independence of the ECB is under threat? Second, is the use of the instruments and the taking on of the new tasks and responsibilities by an independent institution justified in a democracy or is there a relevant democratic deficit? With respect to these two questions the result of this paper is that especially the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) and the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) have to be judged critically.

JEL-codes: E42 E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kuk:journl:v:52:y:2019:i:1:p:35-68

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