Budget Processes and Commitment to Fiscal Discipline
JÃ¼rgen von Hagen () and
Ian J. Harden ()
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JÃ¼rgen von Hagen: University of Bonn, Institute for International Economic Policy, LennÃ¨straÃŸe 37, D-53113 Bonn
Ian J. Harden: University of Sheffield, School of Law, Western Bank, Sheffield S10 2TN, UK
Credit and Capital Markets, 2019, vol. 52, issue 4, 527-536
We present a framework of investigation into the political economy of the budget process. Our model suggests that institutional rules governing the budget process can be found to limit the importance of fiscal illusion. Empirical evidence supports that proposition. The choice of rules depends on the political environment as well as the dominant source of uncertainty in the budget process.
Keywords: Budget systems; Government expenditures and deficits; Collective choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H61 H62 D71 D73 H72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kuk:journl:v:52:y:2019:i:4:p:527-536
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