International Antitrust: Demand, Restrictions and Lessons for Customs Union
Svetlana Avdasheva () and
VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, 2012, vol. 9
Enforcement of antitrust rules on the international level, on the one hand, is necessary to deter restriction of competition by the largest market participants, on the other — it suffers from the contradictions between incentives of national players. That is why international competition policy is based on institutional alternatives which look very imperfect. Harmonization of competition rules seems to be a good alternative only at first glance, since transplantation of antitrust provisions in different legal systems with different standards of proofs and different enforcement practices de facto leads to modification of the rule. Effective competition policy at the level of Customs Union requires to take into account all these limitations and risks.
JEL-codes: H77 K21 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nos:voprec:2012-09-6
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