Company Influence on Foreign Aid Disbursement: Is Conditionality Credible when Donors Have Mixed Motives?
Espen Villanger ()
Southern Economic Journal, 2004, vol. 71, issue 2, 334-351
When donors enforce conditionality upon recipients who do not implement the conditions, companies can suffer from cancellation of their contracts with the recipient when aid dries up. A strategic recipient may avoid implementing controversial conditions by only granting a contract to a company that puts pressure on the donor to keep aid flowing. In our model, each of these three agents takes account of each of the two other agents' actions. We show that this triadic structure can be crucial when explaining recipients' use of companies to influence donors to give aid unconditionally, and we offer a time-consistent explanation for the failure of conditionality.
JEL-codes: E61 F35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9) Track citations by RSS feed
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
Working Paper: Company influence on foreign aid disbursement: Is conditionality credible when donors have mixed motives? (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sej:ancoec:v:71:2:y:2004:p:334-351
Access Statistics for this article
Southern Economic Journal is currently edited by Laura Razzolini
More articles in Southern Economic Journal from Southern Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Laura Razzolini (). This e-mail address is bad, please contact .