R&D Subsidies, Spillovers, and Privatization in Mixed Markets
Maria José Gil-Moltó (),
Joanna Poyago-Theotoky and
Vasileios Zikos ()
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Maria José Gil-Moltó: Department of Economics, University of Leicester, Leicester LE1 7RH, England, UK
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Maria Jose Gil Molto ()
Southern Economic Journal, 2011, vol. 78, issue 1, 233-255
We examine the use of subsidies to research and development (R&D) in a mixed and a private duopoly market. We show that the socially optimal R&D subsidy is increasing in the degree of spillovers, but it is lower in the private duopoly. The optimal R&D subsidy leads to an increase in total R&D and production; however, it does not lead to the equalization of per firm output and therefore to an efficient distribution of production costs. We also find that privatization of the public firm reduces R&D activity and welfare in the duopoly market. This result stands even when optimal R&D subsidies are provided.
JEL-codes: L31 L32 O38 L13 L50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: R&D Subsidies, Spillovers and Privatization in Mixed Markets (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sej:ancoec:v:78:1:y:2011:p:233-255
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