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Seller Beware: Supply and Demand Reduction and Price Manipulation in Multiple-Unit Uniform Price Auctions

Abel Winn, Michael L. Parente () and David Porter
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Michael L. Parente: Capital Habeus Unit of the Office of the Federal Public Defender, 321 E. 2nd St., Los Angeles, CA 90012, USA

Southern Economic Journal, 2016, vol. 82, issue 3, 760-780

Abstract: We experimentally compare under-revelation of supply and demand across alternative variations of ascending and descending two-sided price clock auctions. We find that buyers reduce demand more when the price is ascending but sellers’ behavior is consistent across clock directions. As a result, the clock price rule has empirical effects on efficiency even though it is theoretically neutral.

JEL-codes: D02 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/soej.12086

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sej:ancoec:v:82:3:y:2016:p:760-780

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