Price strategies and entry deterrence in the municipal solid waste disposal industry: a signalling game

Francesco Silvestri () and Mattia Tassinari ()
Additional contact information
Francesco Silvestri: University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
Mattia Tassinari: International University of Languages and Media (IULM)

Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, 2025, vol. 42, issue 3, No 9, 853-873

Abstract: Abstract The article discusses the municipal solid waste (MSW) industry in the EU and the competition within the disposal segment. By using a simplified but comprehensive formalization of the MSW market, the case of potential competition between an innovative outsider (an incinerator with waste-to-energy technology) and a traditional incumbent (a landfill) is introduced. The incumbent cannot prevent a fully informed outsider from entering the market by implementing predatory pricing strategies. However, the presence of recycling as an alternative to end-of-the-pipe disposal introduces uncertainty to the outsider, who must rely on a structure of beliefs to decide whether enter the market. We show that strategic uncertainty represents the main barrier to effective competition in the MSW disposal sector. This challenge can be mitigated through a comprehensive policy approach that improves market efficiency while supporting the EU’s broader environmental objectives.

Keywords: Municipal solid waste industry; Anti-competitive practices; Predatory pricing; Signalling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L41 L97 Q53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s40888-025-00372-3 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:epolit:v:42:y:2025:i:3:d:10.1007_s40888-025-00372-3

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/40888

DOI: 10.1007/s40888-025-00372-3

Access Statistics for this article

Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics is currently edited by Alberto Quadrio Curzio

More articles in Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics from Springer, Fondazione Edison
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().