The game theory issues of blockchain digital ecosystem in cross-border trade

Jie Li (), Rui Wang (), Xiaotong Cai (), Yansheng Chen () and Chao Cao ()
Additional contact information
Jie Li: Guangdong Industry Polytechnic University
Rui Wang: Nanjing Agricultural University
Xiaotong Cai: Guangdong University of Finance
Yansheng Chen: Guangdong Industry Polytechnic University
Chao Cao: Nanjing Agricultural University

International Journal of System Assurance Engineering and Management, 2025, vol. 16, issue 12, No 3, 3919 pages

Abstract: Abstract While blockchain technology holds transformative potential for cross-border trade, existing studies inadequately address multi-stakeholder incentive misalignment and regulatory fragmentation across jurisdictions. This paper bridges critical gaps: the lack of empirically validated models quantifying dynamic trade-offs among customs (prioritizing compliance), financial institutions (managing risk-return), and enterprises (maximizing profits), and the absence of mechanisms harmonizing blockchain ecosystems with heterogeneous legal frameworks. This study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model integrating cost–benefit parameters and policy adaptation metrics. Using the Hengqin Guangdong-Macao case, empirical analysis demonstrates that blockchain adoption achieves Pareto efficiency. Sensitivity analysis confirms model robustness (± 0.15 parameter variance tolerance), while cross-chain legal compliance protocols resolve of jurisdictional conflicts. Key findings demonstrate that blockchain digital ecosystems enhance trade efficiency by enabling real-time information synchronization, reduce operational risks through immutable transaction records, and alleviate trust barriers via decentralized governance. Results establish that blockchain ecosystems optimize multi-party collaboration only when technical interoperability coexists with dynamic incentive rebalancing, offering policymakers a replicable framework to align decentralized innovation with cross-border regulatory coherence.

Keywords: Cross-border trade; Multi-stakeholder game model; Blockchain regulatory harmonization; Pareto efficiency; Smart contract compliance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O24 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13198-025-02895-1 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:ijsaem:v:16:y:2025:i:12:d:10.1007_s13198-025-02895-1

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/engineering/journal/13198

DOI: 10.1007/s13198-025-02895-1

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of System Assurance Engineering and Management is currently edited by P.K. Kapur, A.K. Verma and U. Kumar

More articles in International Journal of System Assurance Engineering and Management from Springer, The Society for Reliability, Engineering Quality and Operations Management (SREQOM),India, and Division of Operation and Maintenance, Lulea University of Technology, Sweden
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().