A stable and strategy-proof controlled school choice mechanism with integrated and flexible rules

Minoru Kitahara and Yasunori Okumura ()
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Yasunori Okumura: TUMSAT, Department of Logistics and Information Engineering

International Journal of Game Theory, 2026, vol. 55, issue 1, No 25, 35 pages

Abstract: Abstract We examine a controlled school choice model in which students are divided into types and the distribution of admitted students influences schools’ priority structures. We introduce a general class of priority rules that represent priorities as weak orders (allowing ties) for each given assignment and satisfy three axioms: Preference for Diversity, Within-Type Ordering, and Distributional Consistency. This framework includes the adjusted scoring rule, which flexibly integrates reserves, quotas, and bonus-point rules while accounting for uncertainty in applicants’ types and scores. From such priority profiles, we construct choice functions that satisfy substitutability and size monotonicity. We show that the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism with these functions yields matchings that are stable with respect to the original priority profiles and satisfy group strategy-proofness. Moreover, when priority profiles are restricted to linear orders for each given assignment, our mechanism yields a student-optimal stable matching.

Keywords: Controlled school choice; Affirmative action; Adjusted scoring; Stable mechanism; Strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Working Paper: A Stable and Strategy-Proof Controlled School Choice Mechanism with Integrated and Flexible Rules (2025)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-026-01000-5

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