Robertas Zubrickas ()
International Economic Review, 2015, vol. 56, 751-776
The teacher–student relationship is modeled as an agency problem, where teachers are concerned with human capital formation and students with ability signaling. We distinguish between two cases depending on whether in ability inference the job market can or cannot observe the grading rule applied. We show that many empirical grading patterns, including grade compression and inflation, are all consistent with optimal ability screening when grading rules are unobservable. With observable grading rules, the teacher perfectly screens students' abilities, provided that certain conditions hold. We apply the model to discuss policy applications such as “No Child Left Behind.”
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Optimal grading (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:56:y:2015:i::p:751-776
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0020-6598
Access Statistics for this article
International Economic Review is currently edited by Michael O'Riordan and Dirk Krueger
More articles in International Economic Review from Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().