”Thou shalt not covet...”: Prohibitions, Temptation and Moral Values
Matteo Cervellati () and
Paolo Vanin ()
No 90905, Global Challenges Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
We propose a theory studying temptation in presence of both externally and internally sanctioned prohibitions. Moral values that (internally) sanction prohibited actions and their desire may increase utility by reducing self-control costs, thereby serving as partial commitment devices. We apply the model to crime and study the conditions under which agents would optimally adhere to moral values of honesty. Incentives to be moral are non- monotonic in the crime premium. Larger external punishments increase temptation and demand for morality, so that external and internal sanctions are complements. The model helps rationalizing stylized facts that proved difficult to explain with available theories.
Keywords: Labor; and; Human; Capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: “Thou shalt not covet”: Prohibitions, temptation and moral values (2013)
Working Paper: "Thou Shalt Not Covet...": Prohibitions, Temptation and Moral Values (2013)
Working Paper: ”Thou shalt not covet...”: Prohibitions, Temptation and Moral Values (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemgc:90905
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Global Challenges Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().