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Documento de Trabalho 05/2019 - Using the Moran's I to Detect Bid Rigging in Brazilian Procurement Auctions

Ricardo Andrade Lima () and Guilherme Resende ()

Documentos de Trabalho from Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Cade), Departamento de Estudos Econômicos

Abstract: This paper evaluates if there is systematic correlation between the bids that are placed by competitors in the sealed phase of procurement auctions, which is a situation that may suggest coordinated and fraudulent behaviour. By applying Moran’s I statistic to the residuals of controlled bid regressions and using a novel and public database, we show that the bids that were placed by the investigated companies have positive and statistically significant autocorrelation.

Keywords: Bid-Rigging; Spatial Econometrics; Procurement Auctions; Cartel and Collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2019-12
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:atg:wpaper:52019

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