Fiscal Instruments, Political Business Cycles and the Emu, Some Stylized Facts
John Loizides and
DEOS Working Papers from Athens University of Economics and Business
This paper examines whether incumbent national governments of the member states of the European Union have manipulated the fiscal policy instruments at their disposal in order to create national political business cycles, opportunistic or partisan, in the 1970-98 period.
Keywords: ELECTIONS; GOVERNMENT; FISCAL POLICY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E3 E6 H8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Fiscal Instruments, Political Business Cycles and the Emu, Some Stylized Facts (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aue:wpaper:123
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