Uniform vs. Discriminatory Auctions with Variable Supply - Experimental Evidence
Damian Damianov (),
Jörg Oechssler and
Johannes Gerd Becker ()
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Johannes Gerd Becker: ETH Zürich, Department of Economics
No 460, Working Papers from University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
In the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many costumers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids. Bidders are uncertain about the seller's cost. We experimentally investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in this setting. Exactly as predicted by theory, it turns out that the uniform price auction produces substantially higher bids, and consequently yields higher revenues and profits for the seller. Somewhat surprisingly but again predicted by theory, it also yields a higher number of transactions, which makes it the more efficient auction format.
Keywords: auctions; experiment; discriminatory; uniform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 2007-11, Revised 2007-11
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Journal Article: Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply - experimental evidence (2010)
Working Paper: Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply: experimental evidence (2007)
Working Paper: Uniform vs. Discriminatory Auctions with Variable Supply - Experimental Evidence (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:awi:wpaper:0460
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