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Least Unmatched Price Auctions: A First Approach

Jürgen Eichberger and Dmitri Vinogradov

No 471, Working Papers from University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics

Abstract: Least-Unmatched Price Auctions have become a popular format of TV and radio shows. Increasingly, they are also applied in internet trading. In these auctions the lowest single (unique) bid wins. We analyze the game-theoretic solution of least unmatched price auctions when prize, bidding cost and the number of participants are known. We use a large data-set of such auctions in order to contrast actual behavior of players with game-theoretic predictions. In the aggregate, bidding behaviour seems to conform with a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.

Keywords: games; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C93 D01 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2008-07, Revised 2008-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17) Track citations by RSS feed

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:awi:wpaper:0471

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