Central Bank Governance in Monetary Policy Economics (1981-2020)
Donato Masciandaro ()
No 21153, BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers from BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy
The aim of the paper is to shed light on how two factors "central bank's design and central bankers' preferences" progressively assumed a crucial role in the evolution of monetary policy economics in the last four decades. The two factors jointly identify the importance of central bank governance in influencing monetary policy decisions through their interactions with the monetary policy rules, given the assumptions about how macroeconomic systems work.
Keywords: monetary policy; central bank independence; central banker conservatism; monetary policy committees; political economics; behavioural economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E50 E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp20153
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