Strategic Approximations of Discontinuous Games
Philip Reny ()
No 2009-010, Working Papers from Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics
An infinite game is approximated by restricting the players to finite subsets of their pure strategy spaces. A strategic approximation of an infinite game is a countable subset of pure strategies with the property that limits of all equilibria of all sequences of approximating games whose finite strategy sets eventually include each member of the countable set must be equilibria of the infinite game. We provide conditions under which infinite games admit strategic approximations.
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Journal Article: Strategic approximations of discontinuous games (2011)
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