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Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games

Philip Reny ()

No 2013-004, Working Papers from Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics

Abstract: We provide several generalizations of the various equilibrium existence results in Reny (1999), Barelli and Meneghel (2013), and McLennan, Monteiro, and Tourky (2011). We also provide an example demonstrating that a natural additional generalization is not possible. All of the theorems yielding existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria here are stated in terms of the players' preference relations over joint strategies. Hence, in contrast to virtually all of the previous work in the area the present results for pure strategy equilibria are entirely ordinal, as they should be.

Keywords: discontinuous games; Nash equilibrium; pure strategies; ordinal (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ger, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
Date: 2013
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Journal Article: Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games (2016) Downloads
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