Links between securities settlement systems: An oligopoly theoretic approach
No 27/2002, Research Discussion Papers from Bank of Finland
This paper presents a duopoly model of the securities settlement industry.Because pooling a large amount of payments can help in using liquidity efficiently, issuers prefer systems where a large number of securities are issued.If the central securities depositories establish a mutual link that enables investors to make transactions with foreign securities, cost savings can be achieved. However, these links may have unexpected effects on CSDs' pricing, and the issuers' share of the fee burden can increase substantially.It is not advisable to ban additional fees for using the link, as the CSDs might simply increase the fee for domestic transactions. Key words: oligopoly, securities settlement systems JEL classification numbers: L13, G20
JEL-codes: L13 G20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Published in Published in International Review of Financial Analysis, Vol. 13, Issue 5, 2004: 585-600
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: The links between securities settlement systems: An oligopoly theoretic approach (2004)
Working Paper: Links between securities settlement systems: An oligopoly theoretic approach (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bof:bofrdp:2002_027
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Research Discussion Papers from Bank of Finland Bank of Finland, P.O. Box 160, FI-00101 Helsinki, Finland. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Minna Nyman ().