Do Rival Political Parties Enforce Government Efficiency? Canada, 1867-2021*
J. Stephen Ferris () and
No 22-04, Carleton Economic Papers from Carleton University, Department of Economics
This paper investigates the role of inter-party rivalry in enhancing federal government efficiency in post-Confederation Canada. It tests and finds confirmation in the data for two hypotheses.The first is that the ex post size of the first versus second seat share marginis a useful metric of the effectiveness of political partiesinpolicingthe incumbentâ€™sspendingbehaviouroverits period of tenure.The second is the hypothesis thatincumbent party shirking is decreased by greaterel ectoral contestability and contestability is related to the expected number of competing parties nonmonotonically. Classification
Pages: 19 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-pol
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Published: Carleton Economics Working Papers
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:car:carecp:22-04
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Carleton Economic Papers from Carleton University, Department of Economics C870 Loeb Building, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa Ontario, K1S 5B6 Canada.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sabrina Robineau ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).