Paying for primary care: The relationship between payment for primary care physicians and selection of patients based on case-mix
Adrian Rohit Dass,
Richard Glazier and
No 160007, Working Papers from Canadian Centre for Health Economics
This study analyzes whether primary care physicians respond to financial incentives to risk-select patients based on case-mix. We use administrative health data to compare primary care physicians across payment models in Ontario, Canada. We use a panel multinomial selection model to estimate the relationship between payment and risk-selection, while controlling for physician self-selection into payment types. After controlling for physician self-selection, we do not find evidence of risk-selection behaviour. These findings suggest that policy-makers need to be aware of self-selection when implementing payment reforms. Future work should consider the long-term effects of payment reform on access to care for patients with complex healthcare needs.
Keywords: physician behaviour; financial incentives; administrative data; panel data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D22 D21 I11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea
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Published Online, July 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cch:wpaper:160007
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