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A Theory of Voting Patterns and Performance in Private and Public Committees

Daniel Seidmann

No 2006-07, Discussion Papers from The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham

Abstract: We analyze voting in private and public committees whose members care about the selected decision and the rewards which outsiders pay for representing their interests. We characterize the voting pattern and performance in both committees; and we test these implications on the voting patterns of monetary policy committees.

Date: 2006-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe and nep-pol
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Related works:
Journal Article: A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: A Theory of Voting Patterns and Performance in Private and Public Committees (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: A Theory of Voting Patterns and Performance in Private and Public Committees (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: A Theory of Voting Patterns and Performance in Private and Public Committees (2006)
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