Perverse Committee Appointments May Foster Divide and Rule
No 2006-08, Discussion Papers from The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham
We analyze optimal appointments to a committee whose members play an admissibly coalition proof equilibrium. The nominator may appoint a candidate with the opposite preference ordering over the agenda, as the committee would then reach the nominator’s top ranked decision by divide and rule: the majority who prefer another decision are immobilised by internal divisions. Our results may explain why Disraeli extended the franchise to skilled male workers in 1867 against centrist opposition; and why an electorate whose preferences are not polarized may choose a polarized voting pattern.
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Journal Article: Perverse committee appointments may foster divide and rule (2008)
Working Paper: Perverse Committee Appointments May Foster Divide and Rule (2006)
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