Market Structure and Borrower Welfare in Microfinance
Maitreesh Ghatak () and
Jonathan de Quidt ()
STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series from Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE
Motivated by recent controversies surrounding the role of commercial lenders in microfinance, we analyze borrower welfare under different market structures,considering a benevolent non-profit lender, a for-profit monopolist, and a competitive credit market. To understand the magnitude of the effects analyzed, we simulate the model with parameters estimated from the MIX Market database. Our results suggest that market power can have severe implications for borrower welfare, while despite possible information frictions competition typically delivers similar borrower welfare to non-profit lending. In addition, for-profit lenders are less likely to use joint liability than non-profits.
Keywords: microfinance; market power; for-profit; social capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 O12 D4 L4 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Market Structure and Borrower Welfare in Microfinance (2018)
Working Paper: Market Structure and Borrower Welfare in Micro Finance (2013)
Working Paper: Market Structure and Borrower Welfare in Microfinance (2012)
Working Paper: Market structure and borrower welfare in microfinance (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:stieop:40
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