Let Me Vote! An Experimental Study of the Effects of Vote Rotation in Committees
Philipp Maier (),
Vjollca Sadiraj () and
Frans van Winden ()
DNB Working Papers from Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department
We conduct an experiment to investigate (i) whether rotation in voting increases a committee's efficiency, and (ii) the extent to which rotation is likely to critically influence collective and individual welfare. The experiment is based on the idea that voters have to trade-off individual versus common interests. Our findings indicate that the choice of a rotation scheme has important consequences: it 'pays' to be allowed to vote, as voting committee members earn significantly more than non-voting members. Hence, rotation is not neutral. We also find that smaller committees decide faster and block fewer decisions. This reduces frustration among committee members.
Keywords: Decision-making; committee; experiment; voting; rotation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D78 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:023
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