Reforming the architecture of EMU: Ensuring stability in Europe
Jakob de Haan (),
Jeroen Hessel () and
DNB Working Papers from Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department
This paper analyses the reforms in the architecture of EMU since the eruption of the euro crisis in 2010. We describe major weaknesses in the original set-up of EMU, such as lack of fiscal discipline, diverging financial cycles and competitiveness positions, and a lack of crisis instruments. These weaknesses appeared against the background of a strong increase in financial integration and financial imbalances since the Maastricht treaty was signed. European policymakers have addressed all weaknesses in the EMU architecture in some way or the other, which is a major achievement. Yet, the effectiveness of the new framework will crucially depend on strict implementation. We discuss whether in the longer run the current balance between policy coordination and risk sharing can be improved upon.
Keywords: Economic and Monetary Union; Financial Cycles; Financial crisis; European debt crisis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E44 E58 F36 G15 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:446
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