Spillover of Domestic Regulation to Emerging Markets
DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) from Netherlands Central Bank
Correlation between the risks of portfolios of different commercial banks leads to too much risk taking from a social planner's perspective. The presence of a regulator improves this risk-benefit allocation of the financial system. In this paper I show that first-best regulation also leads to more attention for the fundamentals of borrowing countries.
Keywords: Bank Regulation; Spillovers; Fundamentals. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G28 L16 F34 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Spillover of domestic regulation to emerging markets (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dnb:staffs:90
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