Should the ECB coordinate EMU fiscal policies?
Celsa Machado and
Ana Paula Ribeiro
Working Papers from Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow
In a monetary union where fiscal authorities act strategical ly fiscal cooperation is unlikely to emerge as an equilibrium. Even when the cooperative outco me is the best for a national fiscal authority, it is either not a Nash equilibrium, or only one of several Nash equilibria. The monetary authority may have an important coordinating role ; however, the Pareto-preferred equilibrium will not necessarily involve cooperation.
Keywords: Monetary and Fiscal Policy Coordination; Monetary Union (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E61 E63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Journal Article: Should the ECB Coordinate EMU Fiscal Policies? (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gla:glaewp:2018-02
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