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Cognitive Empathy in Conflict Situations

Florian Gauer () and Christoph Kuzmics
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Florian Gauer: Bielefeld University

No 2016-02, Graz Economics Papers from University of Graz, Department of Economics

Abstract: Two individuals are involved in a conflict situation in which preferences are ex ante uncertain. While they eventually learn their own preferences, they have to pay a small cost if they want to learn their opponent’s preferences. We show that, for sufficiently small positive costs of information acquisition, in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the resulting game of incomplete information the probability of getting informed about the opponent’s preferences is bounded away from zero and one.

Keywords: Incomplete Information; Information Acquisition; Theory of Mind; Conflict; Imperfect Empathy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D03 D74 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-neu and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: COGNITIVE EMPATHY IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: Cognitive empathy in conflict situations (2016) Downloads
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