To claim or not to claim: Anonymity, reciprocal externalities and honesty
Christian Schitter (),
Jürgen Fleiß () and
Stefan Palan ()
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Christian Schitter: Department of Banking and Finance, University of Graz
Jürgen Fleiß: Department of Corporate Leadership and Entrepreneurship, University of Graz
No 2017-01, Working Paper Series, Social and Economic Sciences from Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences, Karl-Franzens-University Graz
This paper investigates the determinants of (dis)honesty of reporters filing unverified claims for money. First, does honest reporting increase when each reporter's unverified claim is made public? We present experimental evidence to this effect. The driver behind this is activation of the preference for appearing honest. Second, does honest reporting increase when it is public knowledge that reporters' claims affect others and reporters are reciprocally affected by others' claims? We find no such effect. Fear of losing out against others who untruthfully claim too much may outweigh honesty and pro-social considerations.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:grz:wpsses:2017-01
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