Status and Reputation Nudging
Julia Rose (),
Michael Kirchler () and
Stefan Palan ()
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Michael Kirchler: Department of Banking and Finance, University of Innsbruck
No 2019-03, Working Paper Series, Social and Economic Sciences from Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences, Karl-Franzens-University Graz
Status and reputation concerns are conjectured to be important especially in markets with information asymmetries between buyers and sellers, such as in credence goods markets. To investigate the effects of status and reputation on reciprocal behavior of sales personnel in a financial credence goods market, we run a natural field experiment. We send e-mail requests to insurance brokers asking for an appointment. We find that status nudging and, with a larger effect size, reputation nudging in the e-mails increase brokersâ€™ response rates compared to a neutral request. Both effects are robust across all responses, only counting affirmative responses, and in urban and rural areas.
Pages: 24 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
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Working Paper: Status and Reputation Nudging (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:grz:wpsses:2019-03
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