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Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems When Agents Vary in Their Ability?

Claude Meidinger, Jean-Louis Rullière () and Marie Claire Villeval ()
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Claude Meidinger: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Keywords: experiments; free riding; compensation; peer pressure; teamwork (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01182347
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Published in Experimental Economics, Springer Verlag (Germany), 2003, 6 (3), pp. 253-272

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Journal Article: Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems When Agents Vary in Their Ability? (2003) Downloads
Working Paper: Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability? (2003)
Working Paper: Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability ? (2001) Downloads
Working Paper: Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability? (2001)
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