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The Rational Group

Franz Dietrich

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: Can a group be a standard rational agent? This would require the group to hold aggregate preferences which maximise expected utility and change only by Bayesian updating. Group rationality is possible, but the only preference aggregation rules which support it (and are minimally Paretian and continuous) are the linear-geometric rules, which combine individual tastes linearly and individual beliefs geometrically.

Date: 2020-01-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-upt
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02431868
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Working Paper: The Rational Group (2020)
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