The perils of democracy
Gregory J. DeAngelo,
Dimitri Dubois () and
Rustam Romaniuc ()
Additional contact information
Gregory J. DeAngelo: Claremont Graduate University [Claremont, CA ]
Post-Print from HAL
In this work we examine a common social dilemma in experimental economics, the public goods game, to determine how voting impacts pro-social behavior. As noted in Markussen et al. (2014), a democratic dividend exists. Couching the public goods game in a phe- nomenon that is playing out in much of the world –drasticincome inequality –weex- amine the decision of groups to share local public goods with groups that have, effectively, no endowment to contribute toward public nor private consumption. Our results show the perils of democracy in that subjects in the position to vote use their advantageous situa- tion to reward the ingroups at the expense of the less endowed outgroup members
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.umontpellier.fr/hal-01952489
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Elsevier, In press, à paraître, à paraître. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2018.06.020⟩
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01952489
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().