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Collusion between two-sided platforms

Yassine Lefouili and Joana Pinho ()

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Abstract: We study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two-sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market, and whether users single-home or multi-home. Our most striking result is that one-sided collusion leads to lower (resp. higher) prices on the collusive (resp. competitive) side if the cross-group externalities exerted on the collusive side are positive and sufficiently strong. One-sided collusion may, therefore, benefit the users on the collusive side and harm the users on the competitive side. Our findings have implications regarding cartel detection and damages actions.

Keywords: Collusion; Two-sided markets; Cross-group externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-law and nep-mic
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02929298
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Published in International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, 2020, 72 (102656), ⟨10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102656⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02929298

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102656

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