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Robust Social Decisions

Eric Danan (), Thibault Gajdos (), Brian Hill () and Jean-Marc Tallon ()
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Jean-Marc Tallon: PSE - Paris School of Economics, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" from HAL

Abstract: We propose and operationalize normative principles to guide social decisions when individuals potentially have imprecise and heterogeneous beliefs, in addition to conflicting tastes or interests. To do so we adapt the standard Pareto principle to those preference comparisons that are robust to belief imprecision and characterize social preferences that respect this robust principle. We also characterize a suitable restriction of this principle. The former principle provides stronger guidance when it can be satisfied; when it cannot, the latter always provides minimal guidance.

Keywords: Unambiguous preferences; Pareto dominance; Prefer-ence aggregation; Social choice; Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-upt
Date: 2015-12-11
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01241819
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Related works:
Journal Article: Robust Social Decisions (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Robust Social Decisions (2016) Downloads
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