Robust Social Decisions
Eric Danan (),
Thibault Gajdos (),
Brian Hill () and
Jean-Marc Tallon ()
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Jean-Marc Tallon: PSE - Paris School of Economics, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" from HAL
We propose and operationalize normative principles to guide social decisions when individuals potentially have imprecise and heterogeneous beliefs, in addition to conflicting tastes or interests. To do so we adapt the standard Pareto principle to those preference comparisons that are robust to belief imprecision and characterize social preferences that respect this robust principle. We also characterize a suitable restriction of this principle. The former principle provides stronger guidance when it can be satisfied; when it cannot, the latter always provides minimal guidance.
Keywords: Unambiguous preferences; Pareto dominance; Prefer-ence aggregation; Social choice; Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Journal Article: Robust Social Decisions (2016)
Working Paper: Robust Social Decisions (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseose:hal-01241819
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