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Bargaining through Approval

Matias Nuñez and Jean-François Laslier ()

PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" from HAL

Abstract: The paper considers two-person bargaining under Approval Voting. It first proves the existence of pure strategy equilibria. Then it shows that this bargaining method ensures that both players obtain at least their mean utility level in equilibrium. Finally it proves that, provided that the players are partially honest, the mechanism triggers sincerity and ensures that no alternative Pareto dominates the outcome of the game.

Keywords: Partial honesty; Two-agents; Approval Voting; Efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-10
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01321737
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Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, 2015, 60, pp.63-73. <10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.015>

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseose:halshs-01321737

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.015

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