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Strategic information transmission with sender's approval

Francoise Forges and Jérôme Renault ()
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Jérôme Renault: TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole

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Abstract: We consider a sender-receiver game with an outside option for the sender. After the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a proposal to the sender, which the latter can reject. We study situations in which the sender's approval is crucial to the receiver. We show that a partitional, (perfect Bayesian Nash) equilibrium exists if the sender has only two types or if the receiver's preferences over decisions do not depend on the type of the sender as long as the latter participates. The result does not extend: we construct a counter-example (with three types for the sender and type-dependent affine utility functions) in which there is no mixed equilibrium. In the three type case, we provide a full characterization of (possibly mediated) equilibria.

Date: 2020-01-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02440627
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