Political Loyalty Vs Economic Performance: Evidence from Machine Politics in Russia’S Regions
Michael Rochlitz ()
No WP BRP 34/PS/2016, HSE Working papers from National Research University Higher School of Economics
Electoral authoritarian regimes often rely on patron-client relationships and political machines to win elections. While a growing literature has focused on the reasons why authoritarian regimes might want to hold elections, the economic consequences associated with the need to win elections have been less intensely studied. In this paper, we argue that while holding elections might offer authoritarian regimes a range of informational and other advantages in the short and medium run, the long-term economic costs can be significant and potentially destabilizing. This effect is especially strong in transition economies, where outdated and inefficient economic structures might be kept alive for political reasons. The theory is tested with an original dataset of gubernatorial appointments from a leading electoral authoritarian regime, the Russian Federation. We find that by incentivizing regional governors to use their political machines to win elections for the regime, the Kremlin effectively punishes those governors that are successfully developing their regional economies, with the effect being especially strong in regions where a high percentage of the population lives in Soviet-era single company towns.
Keywords: authoritarian elections; political machines; bureaucratic incentives; patronclient relationships; economic growth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: M51 O43 P31 P52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cis, nep-pol and nep-tra
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6) Track citations by RSS feed
Published in WP BRP Series: Political Science / PS, May 2016, pages 1-34
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hig:wpaper:34/ps/2016
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in HSE Working papers from National Research University Higher School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Shamil Abdulaev ().