The Pill and Marital Stability
Andrew Zuppann ()
No 201310812, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Houston
Better contraception will have competing impacts on marital stability and divorce rates. Preexisting marriages are likely to become less stable as better contraception raises the value of reentering the dating market. Subsequent marriages are likely to be more stable as couples delay marriages and use better contraception to search for better partners. Â I investigate this hypothesis using variation in access to the birth control pill by state and cohort as developed by Goldin and Katz (2002). Â Access to the pill decreased stability of preexisting marriages and increased stability of subsequent marriages.
Keywords: contraception; pill; divorce; marriage; marital stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J13 N3 I0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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