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Every Symmetric 3 x 3 Global Game of Strategic Complementarities Is Noise Independent

Christian Basteck () and Tijmen R. Daniëls
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Tijmen R. Daniëls

SFB 649 Discussion Papers from Humboldt University, Collaborative Research Center 649

Abstract: We prove that the global game selection in all 3 x 3 payoff-symmetric supermodular games is independent of the noise structure. As far as we know, all other proofs of noise independence of such games rely on the existence of a so-called monotone potential (MP) maximiser. Our result is more general, since some 3 x 3 symmetric supermodular games do not admit an MP maximiser. Moreover, a corollary is that noise independence does not imply the existence of an MP maximiser.

Keywords: global games; noise independence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2010-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Journal Article: Every symmetric 3×3 global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection (2011) Downloads
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