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Cognitive Ability and Games of School Choice

Christian Basteck () and Marco Mantovani ()

No SFB649DP2016-037, SFB 649 Discussion Papers from Humboldt University, Collaborative Research Center 649

Abstract: We take school admission mechanisms to the lab to test whether the widely-used manipulable Boston-mechanism disadvantages students of lower cognitive ability and whether this leads to ability segregation across schools. Results show this is the case: lower ability participants receive lower payoffs and are over-represented at the worst school. Under the strategy-proof Deferred Acceptance mechanism, payoff differences are reduced, and ability distributions across schools harmonized. Hence, we find support for the argument that a strategy-proof mechanisms “levels the playing-field”. Finally, we document a trade-off between equity and efficiency in that average payoffs are larger under Boston than under Deferred Acceptance.

JEL-codes: C78 C91 D82 I24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-neu and nep-ure
Date: 2016-10
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Related works:
Journal Article: Cognitive ability and games of school choice (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: Cognitive Ability and Games of School Choice (2016) Downloads
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