(Un)expected Monetary Policy Shocks and Term Premia
Martin Kliem () and
No SFB649DP2017-015, SFB 649 Discussion Papers from Humboldt University, Collaborative Research Center 649
We analyze an estimated stochastic general equilibrium model that replicates key macroeconomic and financial stylized facts during the Great Moderation of 1983-2007. Our model predicts a sizeable and volatile nominal term premium - comparable to recent reduced-form empirical estimates - with real risk two times more important than in ation risk for the average nominal term premia. The model enables us to address salient questions about the effects of monetary policy on the term structure of interest rates. We nd that monetary policy shocks can have differing effects on risk premia. Actions by the monetary authority with a persistent effect on households' expectations have substantial effects on nominal and real risk premia. Our model rationalizes many of the opposing ndings on the effects of monetary policy on term premia in the empirical literature.
Keywords: DSGE model; Bayesian estimation; Term structure; Monetary policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E13 E31 E43 E44 E52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-dge, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Working Paper: (Un)expected Monetary Policy Shocks and Term Premia (2018)
Working Paper: (Un)expected monetary policy shocks and term premia (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2017-015
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