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Monetary Union in West Africa; An Agency of Restraint for Fiscal Policies?

Catherine A Pattillo and Paul Masson ()

No 01/34, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: Could a West African monetary union (either of the non-CFA countries, or all ECOWAS members) be an effective "agency of restraint" on fiscal policies? We discuss how monetary union could affect fiscal discipline and the arguments for explicit fiscal restraints considered in the European Monetary Union literature, and their applicability to West Africa. The empirical evidence, EMU literature, and CFA experience suggest that monetary union could create the temptation for fiscal profligacy through prospects of a bailout, or costs diluted through the membership. Thus, a West African monetary union could promote fiscal discipline only if the hands of the fiscal authorities are also tied by a strong set of fiscal restraints.

Keywords: Africa; Fiscal rules; Fiscal policy; Trade; West Africa; West African Monetary Union; monetary union, fiscal discipline, ECOWAS, CFA franc zone, central bank, inflation, fiscal policies, (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
Date: 2001-03-01
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